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Abstract 
This paper engages with the question of the historical and ontological status of the logics of 
hegemony articulated by Ernesto Laclau. It interrogates the concept of real abstraction that Laclau 
mobilises to explain the historical status of his theory. It is argued that while Laclau grounds his 
conceptual system in an ontology of generalised antagonism, this is done to the exclusion of 
formally conceiving the historical conditions of those logics. The paper demonstrates that it is the 
irreducible gap between reflection on historical and ontological conditions of possibility from which 
the most pervasive critiques of Laclau’s work are derived. In turning to the work of Alfred Sohn-
Rethel, the paper suggests a different conception of real abstraction, one which locates the sources 
of abstraction in the division of mental and manual labour. In drawing on the Marxist analysis of real 
abstraction and the division of labour, the essay seeks to deflate the subsumption of politics to 
ontology and to turn attention to the logics which condition the possibility of social struggle today – 
namely, the logics of contemporary capitalism. 
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Introduction: From Marxist Topographies to Post-Marxist Logics 
No other thinker is more closely associated with the theoretical paradigm of ‘post-Marxism’ than 
Ernesto Laclau.  Central to Laclau’s work, and to post-Marxism more broadly, is an articulation of 
collective social struggle in opposition to vulgar materialist and orthodox Marxist topographical 
conceptions of the political wherein legal, political, and ideological superstructures are read off and 
categorised according to the way they reflect the terms of an infrastructural economic level.  While 
emerging from and drawing upon a Marxist heritage, post-Marxist political theories tend to locate 
the sources and conditions of social struggle and emancipation within some axiomatic, irreducible 
principle or kernel of contingency, agency or subjectivity (generally inscribed in an ontological 
register) which functions as the guarantor or promise of the possibility of social struggle. 
Accordingly, the tendency is to draw a binary between the properly political moment or principle – 
indexed by notions of ‘event’, ‘antagonism’, ‘equality’, ‘multitude’, or ‘singularity’ – and the juridical, 
regulative, disciplinary or administrative order of everyday politics which it disrupts.i Such 
articulations of the terrain of political theorising upon the purity of some political principle or 
notion of ‘event’ have sought to sustain the possibility of collective struggle in an epoch of class 
decomposition and defeat for the post-1968 Left, but in doing so, they have (perhaps unwittingly) 
produced their own aporias. First, the possibility of meaningful social transformation is sustained 
but at the cost of divorcing the concept of the political from any critique of political economy and 
from the quotidian work of political organising, analysis, and even conciliation. A second, more 
profound problem relates to the first, for insofar as the political is analytically distinguished and 
separated from every determinate order, the historicity of the concept of ‘the political’ itself is not 
interrogated. A circularity is introduced, in which the political is affirmed in terms of some sui generis 
principle which is itself never situated politically or related to its own historical conditions.ii 
 
This article investigates this aporia of historicity as it exists in Laclau’s work. Investigating Laclau’s 
work in terms of this problematic permits us to evaluate his own contribution to recent debates in 
emancipatory political theory and provides an analysis of the limitations of Laclau’s response to 
some pervasive theoretical problems. In particular, this article interrogates Laclau’s mobilisation of 
the concept of ‘real abstraction’ in his attempt to resolve the conceptual impasse described above. In 
doing so it confronts Laclau with a materialist conception of abstraction, exemplified in this case by 
the work of Alfred Sohn-Rethel. While restricting our account to Sohn-Rethel will involve 
amputating fecund debate and dialogue over materialist accounts of the conditions of conceptual 
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abstraction, we justify doing so insofar as it serves our aim of interrogating Laclau’s negotiation with 
questions central to much recent political theorising.iii 
 
Laclau has sought to negotiate the vicious circularity between his ontological conception of the 
political and its historicity by relating his own post-Marxist theory of generalised antagonism to 
certain historical transformations, in particular the change from a Fordist to a post-Fordist mode of 
production. For Laclau, the emergence of a ‘globalised’ or ‘disorganised’ capitalism and the 
proliferation of social actors around new social movements reveal not only the limitations of 
orthodox Marxism, but also and more fundamentally the fact that there is never any immutable 
essence to society and that social identities are always politically constituted.iv On the basis of his 
diagnosis of the present Laclau rejects a topographical understanding of the social – in which one 
level of the social structure (such as its economic base) explains all the other levels – in favour of his 
own logics of hegemony. Laclau claims that to shift the scope of the analysis from an orthodox 
topography to the terrain of logics is not to move to a merely descriptive account of the agents and 
processes involved in the formation and dissolution of collective identities but to a ‘formal analysis’ 
of their conditions.v In response to the question of the historical and political status of his own 
ontology, Laclau has argued that he conducts a formal analysis of ‘abstractions’ towards which the 
real itself tends: 
 
‘[f]ormal analysis and abstraction are essential for the study of concrete historical 
processes – not only because the theoretical construction of the object is the 
requirement of any intellectual practice worthy of the name, but also because social 
reality itself generates abstractions which organise its own principles of functioning.  
Thus Marx, for instance, showed how the formal and abstract laws of commodity 
production are at the core of the actual and concrete workings of capitalist societies.  In 
the same way, when we try to explain the structuration of political fields through 
categories such as ‘logics of equivalence,’ ‘logics of difference’ and ‘production of empty 
signifiers,’ we are attempting to construct a theoretical horizon whose abstractions are 
not merely analytical but real abstractions on which the constitution of identities and 
political articulations depends’.vi 
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This article will argue that Laclau’s theoretical mobilisation of the notion of real abstraction in 
response to the issue of the historicity of his political ontology is philosophically problematic at best 
and politically disabling at worst. It will demonstrate that an irreducible tension exists between 
Laclau’s account of the historical conditions of the logics he derives from the ‘real’ and the political 
ontology he articulates as emerging from out of these logics. It then contrasts what it takes to be 
Laclau’s intellectual conception of real abstraction with a materialist account of intellectual 
abstraction as it is articulated by the thinker most often associated with the term, namely Sohn-
Rethel.vii By drawing on Sohn-Rethel’s deployment of the Marxian conception of abstraction, we 
seek to inform an understanding of philosophical and political abstractions which does not seek to 
subsume the latter to a political ontology but, rather, seeks to historicise and politicise the separation 
of cognitive and material practice. Finally, it will be argued that by politicising the very activity of 
abstraction, the materialist conception of real abstraction informs and also supports political 
theorising which seeks to think the conditions of both political concepts and social struggle in the 
changing and nebulous logics of contemporary capitalism, without limiting itself to the a priori terms 
of a political ontology or hypostatisations of political subjectivity. We start with a brief overview of 
Laclau’s central arguments and concepts. 
 
Post-Marxist Logics and the Ontology of Generalised Antagonism 
The fundamental starting point for Laclau’s political theory is an ontological presupposition: the 
presence of an ‘antagonistic frontier’ within systems of social relations is irreducible; no regime or 
social order is possible without some antagonistic ‘other’ or difference which it expels in its self-
constitution. That is, no social order or collective subject can assume a state of objectivity or self-
identity since every such order is founded upon an ‘infinitude’ which entails that it will always be, in 
part, exclusive as much as inclusive so that its dislocation and concordant contingency is irreducible. 
Given that every social order is ultimately limited or ‘threatened’ insofar as it cannot master the 
infinite possibilities for social antagonism which it seeks to contain, contingency or ‘dislocation’ is, 
Laclau argues, irreducible. This irreducibility, he argues, signals the primacy of an ‘ontological 
dimension’ which is ‘foundational’ to every concrete social order and which Laclau calls simply, ‘the 
political’.viii The import of this political ontology for Laclau’s theory becomes apparent once we 
begin to unpack the conceptual architecture he builds upon it. 
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The basic element of Laclau’s conceptual apparatus, the ‘social demand’, and the logics that he 
derives from it are grounded in his ontological presuppositions.ix For Laclau, the meaning of any 
anti-systemic ‘social demand’ is always split between what he calls its particular dimension and its 
universal dimension. That is to say, insofar as they all bear an anti-systemic meaning, a series of 
particular demands may be united into some broader, more universalising claim which unites them 
and so constitute what Laclau calls a ‘chain of equivalence’. As chains of equivalence are extended to 
encompass more and more particular demands, one particular demand – known as the ‘empty 
signifier’ – has to assume the role of representing the chain as a whole. Take for example the 
transformation of Solidarność which begins as the ‘particular’ demand of local dockworkers in 
Gdansk. As the movement broadens to encompass other demands against the communist regime, 
the particular meaning of Solidarność is gradually ‘emptied’ in order for it to take on a relatively 
universal character. Moreover, the other particular demands which join under its banner (of 
students, the intelligentsia, etc.) also have to take on some of the universal character of the 
movement and thus be ‘split’ from their particularity. As increasingly heterogeneous demands are 
embraced by an equivalential chain, the less its ‘empty signifiers’ are attached to their original 
particular demand, and a relative universality prevails over the expression of particularity.x Similarly, 
other links in the chain are also split between their particular demand and the universal signification 
that they acquire within the equivalential chain. What Laclau calls the logics of hegemony are 
precisely these operations in the social field whereby particularities take up a universal signification 
and, thus, permit the articulation of relatively collective subjects (as exemplified by the ultimately 
broad social base encompassed by Solidarność at its peak). 
 
This is not all, however. Regimes themselves may also engage in hegemonic or equivalential 
operations and thus potentially absorb some oppositional demands. In such cases the ‘antagonistic 
frontier’ between equivalential chains is destabilised insofar as the link which connects some 
particular demands to a broader equivalential relation is broken (as might occur if bosses met the 
demands of some striking workers and not others, thus breaking their unity). This entails that while 
‘logics of equivalence’ universalise demands by making them all bearers of a meaning which 
transcends their particularity, they are opposed by ‘logics of difference’ wherein demands are 
particularised and their equivalential or universalising potential is neutralised.xi In such situations 
wherein an ‘antagonistic frontier’ is destabilised insofar as some of its elements are particularised, the 
latter never remain purely particular, but enter into different sets of equivalences. In this case, either 
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a struggle for different conceptions of universality occurs or, alternatively, a chain is extended to 
encompass those other conceptions of universality (our striking workers might form a new trade 
union that encompasses a broader set of demands, for example).xii Given the existence of a plurality 
of discursive strategies in the same discursive space, the meaning of particular demands may become 
indeterminate so that they may become simultaneously part of different and even competing 
equivalential chains. These signifiers, which Laclau calls ‘floating’, have an emptiness which results 
from the multiple discourses interpreting them in relation to different terms. The concept ‘woman’, 
employed as it is by groups on both the left and the right, or by feminists and anti-feminists, to 
support widely opposing claims is exemplary of such a ‘floating’ signifier.   
 
How does this formalist account of social logics hinge upon and reinforce Laclau’s ontological claim 
for the constitutive status of antagonism? Since it is impossible for an equivalential chain to 
incorporate into itself all possible particular demands or to absorb any particular demand in all its 
heterogeneity, the implication is that no social order can transcend the particularities or differences 
which form it. No regime or collective struggle can ultimately master the multitude of demands 
which ultimately come together under its banner and, accordingly, can never claim any ultimate 
finality, objectivity, or totality. Conversely, unconstrained access to what Laclau sometimes calls the 
‘radical outside’ beyond any equivalential chain or social order to a realm of pure particularities or 
differences is foreclosed since such access would imply transcending all social order and would thus 
itself repeat the totalising move which has already been barred. For Laclau, what he calls the ‘mutual 
subversion’ between the contingent and the necessary or between any ‘concrete social order’ and the 
‘function of ordering’ entails both the irreducibility and the ‘primacy’ of the political conceived as a 
generalised ontological terrain of antagonism.xiii That is, according to the logics of hegemony, 
subversion and antagonism are an irreducible element of all social order. 
 
This deconstructive vision of the political is intended to provide sustenance for social struggle 
insofar as it displaces an orthodox Marxist topographical principle of intelligibility of the social with 
the social logics of hegemony. Laclau argues that social antagonism cannot be read off from some 
economic base which determines a political, juridical, or ideological superstructure: we cannot decide 
whether a given conjuncture is ‘reformist’ or ‘revolutionary’ by locating it within a system of 
topographical locations determined by a subterranean infrastructure. Conceived in terms of the 
logics of variable articulations of equivalence and difference in Laclau’s theory, social antagonism 
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cannot be determined by some more fundamental level or positivity and hence cannot be made 
epiphenomenal to some process beyond it. Thus, for instance, any antagonistic relation between 
workers and capitalists cannot be derived from some schema of the relations of production but 
would require something exterior to them, such as the worker’s identity as a consumer.xiv  
 
Laclau seems to claim that this shift from a topographical principle to a social logics is emancipatory 
for two central reasons. First, because within his schema the subject of social struggle is neither 
determined nor limited in advance. Secondly, this implies that the locus or object of struggle is 
similarly contingent. In short, given the irreducible contingency at the heart of every social order or 
regime, social struggle is indeed irreducible.  Yet if Laclau thus affirms and seeks to sustain social 
struggle as an inherent possibility of any social order, this begs the question of whether the logics of 
hegemony, by which he formalises this possibility, themselves have a historical character? If he fails 
to affirm their historicity then he is caught asserting the sort of transcendent, metaphysical principle 
his own theory disallows. On the other hand, if he posits the logics of hegemony as tied to particular 
historical conditions he implicitly places limitations upon the conception of antagonism and so 
would undermine the primacy he accords to the political and the concordant contingency upon 
which his account relies. It is to a further investigation of this problem to which we now turn. 
 
 
Post-Fordism and Post-Foundationalism 
While Laclau’s conception of generalised antagonism forms the ontological conditions for the 
emergence of the logics of hegemony, he has theorised their historical conditions (or what he often 
calls ‘terrain’) in terms of the structural transformation from Fordist to post-Fordist production, and 
in particular the decentering of power in a ‘globalised world’ wherein agents’ identities are 
‘constitutively overdetermined’.xv Given these historical transformations, he argues that the relations 
of production have lost their centrality in determining political identity, while instead, differential 
identity logics (of race, gender, etc.) increasingly constitute political identities which do not overlap 
with class positions.xvi Drawing upon the Marxist conception of capitalism as a dislocatory force 
divesting us of our illusions, Laclau argues that we have been relieved of the topographical illusion 
of economic determinism and become aware of the contingency underlying political categories that 
we once took to be necessary. In place of an orthodox Marxist topography in which political 
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struggles are determined by an economic infrastructure, he invokes an increased awareness of the 
historicity and contingency of discourses and the unevenness of power relations.xvii     
 
But it is at this point that we might return to the question we have put to Laclau regarding the 
historicity of his categories. What exactly is the relationship between, on the one hand, generalised 
antagonism as ontological condition of the ‘real abstractions’ of which logics of hegemony are the 
formal articulation and, on the other hand, the historical conditions which form the terrain of these 
abstractions? Do the historical transformations of late capitalism reveal an always latent 
‘foundational’ ontology of generalised antagonism? If so, then Laclau is caught positing the sort of a-
historical a priori that his own theory of the political forecloses. However, if he admits their 
historicity then he would have to either admit, as critics have argued, that his concepts merely reflect 
the conditions of late capitalism or reassert some account of the conditions of the logics of 
hegemony.xviii 
 
When pressed by interlocutors regarding the historicity of his own categories, Laclau has refused 
either to set up the logics of hegemony as transcendental categories (since this would mark them as 
a-historical) or to affirm their absolute situatedness (since this would amount to sneaking in some 
other ‘meta-theoretical’ framework of historicity, itself assuming a transcendental status). Rather, 
Laclau’s solution has been to draw a strict category distinction between the ontological and historical 
conditions of hegemonic logics, and to exclude the possibility of a formal historical account from 
out of the logics of hegemony themselves: ‘the very logic of empty signifiers has a genealogy of its 
own – although its formal possibility can be abstractly determined, its historical actualisation depends 
on conditions that are not derivable from that possibility’.xix 
 
But if the historical conditions of these logics cannot be derived from those logics themselves then 
Laclau can only assert, as he rightly does, their contingency and historicity – but at the same time, he 
must, in his words, ‘renounce any attempt to grasp the meaning of its historical variation 
conceptually’. In other words, if he is to remain coherent, Laclau is limited to affirming, in his 
words, the ‘finitude’ of his system of categories.xx While this affirmation of finitude maintains the 
logical consistency of his system, it lies in fundamental tension with his own sociological account of 
its historical conditions. That is, his ontological claim explicitly relies upon a historical narrative of 
the gradual decline of the centrality of working-class identity as a result of structural changes to 
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relations of production in globalised capitalism, which in turn functions as the ground for shifting 
the terms of analysis from topography to logics. Consequently, structural or historical conditions 
cannot ultimately be addressed by the logic of Laclau’s system insofar as they are formally excluded 
by the ontological conditions of discursive logics. If those discursive logics were to admit the 
historical conditions, it would amount to an affirmation of a historical logic in excess of the 
ontology of generalised antagonism.  
 
This tension between history and ontology in Laclau’s work is frequently on display in some of his 
seemingly contradictory articulations. For example, in one text we can find Laclau refusing the 
possibility of any meta-discursive objectivity, claiming that any objectivity is itself necessarily 
discursively constructed since, given his political ontology, ‘antagonism is the limit of all objectivity’.xxi 
Yet a few pages later he proclaims that ‘it is without a doubt true that the phenomenon of 
commodification is at the heart of the multiple dislocations of traditional social relations’.xxii Or 
again, in another text, while affirming his political ontology Laclau nevertheless appeals to ‘an 
analysis of the objective tendencies undermining [notions such as class struggle]’ to support his 
narrative of the historical emergence of generalised antagonism.xxiii  
 
As we noted above, Laclau has sought to justify this oscillation between the ontological and the 
historical or sociological by drawing on the Marxist concept of ‘real abstraction’. Hegemonic logics, 
he argues, are ‘forms of structural determination which are context-specific’ insofar as they are real 
abstractions, that is, ‘an abstract which is not a formal dimension proceeding or separate from the 
concrete, but something to which the concrete tends’. In support of his claim to maintain both the 
historicity and the ontological status of his theory Laclau gives three analogical examples of such 
‘concrete abstracts’ in order to defend his notion of a concept which emerges upon a particular 
historical terrain yet which transcends these temporal boundaries: the Marxian concepts of labor and 
of the commodity-form, and the concept of human rights.xxiv All three concepts, he argues, function 
analogously to his own account of the logics of hegemony since they can only emerge with particular 
historical developments yet come to have analytical purchase and produce concrete effects upon the 
world. 
 
The problem here hinges upon Laclau's use of the notion of real abstraction. As we will argue in 
more detail below, in the Marxist notion of real abstraction social relations are mediated by abstract 
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logics. Both the examples of abstract labor and of the commodity-form imply that the process of 
abstraction is operative in the world, anterior or a priori to abstractions in thought. In this materialist 
notion of real abstraction, as Fredric Jameson puts it, “we can think abstractly about the world only 
to the degree to which the world itself has already become abstract.”xxv Conversely, in the case of 
human rights there is an abstraction from real inequalities or differences to produce a generic 
concept of personhood: the formal subject of rights is an a posteriori intellectual or even ideological 
abstraction from a real person. A similar inversion or intellectual abstraction occurs in the course of 
Laclau’s presentation of the logics of hegemony. That is, these logics are imposed upon social reality 
by the intellectual act of the theorist and in turn produce insights that are then taken as evidence for 
the nature of social being as such. The abstraction from the content of particular social struggles or 
demands does not occur in practice but in an a posteriori imposition of mental logic upon the world. 
While we will examine the implications of taking up either intellectual or materialist notions of 
abstraction further below, let us assert at this point that Laclau’s reference to the concept does not 
rescue him from the problem of the historicity of his categories. In fact, in drawing upon an 
intellectual conception of abstraction his dilemma is not unlike that of the idealist defence of human 
rights, inevitably caught oscillating between defending the universality of rights while affirming the 
historical and cultural specificity of their origins.xxvi 
 
Laclau seeks to deflate any “objectivist” historical claims that his use of the notion of real 
abstraction might imply by reference to the Marxian notion of “tendency” yet this merely shifts the 
weight of the claim back to the tension between Laclau’s account of structural historical 
transformations and his account of the logics of hegemony. That social actors and movements have 
undergone transformation in recent decades is without question. However, the interpretation of 
those changes offered by Laclau, whether tendential or complete, relies upon a meta-discursive 
historical logic that his ontology prohibits. In short, whatever descriptive salience Laclau’s logics of 
hegemony might have, they hold no explanatory power since their conditions are theorised not as 
historical but, through the imposition of an intellectual abstraction, as ontological.  
 
What are the political effects of this irreducible tension between ontology and history in Laclau’s 
work? While Laclau has sought sustenance for social struggle in the contingency of the social order 
it seeks to reveal, in failing to satisfactorily connect those theoretical claims to historical or 
sociological ones, the outcome seems in fact to mark a retreat from any meaningful engagement 
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with the problems, strategies and negotiations which any social struggle must face. This is apparent 
in the two most prevalent and enduring criticisms of Laclau’s work.  
 
First and most prevalent is the charge of idealism, made most infamously by Norman Geras in his 
review of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. The claim here is that Laclau’s denial of any division between 
the discursive and extra-discursive amounts to a rejection of a ‘pre-discursive reality and an extra-
theoretical objectivity’.xxvii This amounts, it is argued, to a denial of objective reality as such, and 
hence to philosophical idealism. In response to this charge Laclau has insisted that his 
deconstruction of the division between the discursive and extra-discursive is neither idealist nor 
relativist, since the presumption that the meaning of an object is always discursively constructed 
does not exclude the possibility that an object can exist independently of thought: it implies merely 
that the ‘meaning’ or being of an object will always be constituted within a particular discursive 
horizon.xxviii Accordingly, Laclau’s rebuttal to the charge of idealism is premised upon two related 
claims: that discourses are themselves material practices; and that if idealism is defined as a 
‘reduction of the real to the concept’ then the category of the discursive escapes the charge, since the 
irreducibility of antagonism prohibits access to objective reality.xxix  
 
While a generous reading of Laclau might argue that such a claim formally undermines the charge of 
idealism, it nevertheless fails to respond fully to his critics, since it does not address the question of 
the historical conditions of discourse or, more specifically, of particular discourses. For if 
materialism is defined in part by the irreducibility of the real to the concept, it is usually also defined 
as reflection upon the nature and mechanisms of the realities from which thought emerges.xxx Such a 
reflexive mechanism is absent from Laclau’s theory insofar as the political ontology of generalised 
antagonism formally excludes an account of the historical conditions of hegemonic logics. This 
leaves Laclau with the meta-theoretical problem we described above: he appears unable to account 
for what he views as the historical shift from a topographical to a logical analytics of the social 
within the terms of the logics of hegemony. Moreover, in strictly political terms he is unable to 
provide more than purely formal criteria for explaining why particular logics become hegemonic. 
Given that there is no scope in the theory for an account of discursive transformations, it has been 
argued that Laclau’s system displaces any explanation of the emergence of particular demands or 
struggles for their discursive interpretation.xxxi  
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The second major criticism of Laclau concerns the emancipatory potential of his work. In anchoring 
his conception of logics upon the ontological category of the founding moment of society to the 
formal exclusion of history, Laclau’s political theory also locates this moment – the contingent 
antagonistic limit which guarantees the contingency of any social order or identity – as the essential 
moment of any emancipatory politics. As a number of scholars have persuasively claimed, this 
ostensibly ‘radical’ gesture disables in advance the pursuit of truly emancipatory collective acts: any 
collective political gesture will be blind to its conditions of possibility and so may lead to a politics of 
cynical resignation.xxxii It is in this sense that we can situate Laclau’s claim that if, following the 
analytical shift from topography to logics, there is nevertheless a conception of ‘false consciousness’ 
to be maintained, it is insofar as ideological misrecognition be re-defined as the failure to affirm the 
particularity and situatedness of any claim to universality.xxxiii Once political theory is conceived in 
terms of the critical demand for recognition of the ontological facticity of antagonism and of 
contingency as constitutive of social relations, it functions to bracket politics itself insofar as it seems 
to exclude working through the particular nature of antagonistic relations or the lack thereof 
today.xxxiv In short, the limits of the explanatory power of Laclau’s theoretical categories lie in the 
way in which the ‘real’ of his abstractions is to be conceived. Insofar as the conditions of abstraction 
are exclusively located in ontology to the formal exclusion of historical analysis, political theory is at 
best relatively inflexible and uninformative or, at worst, disabling of political struggle. 
 
Real abstractions  
We have shown that Laclau’s work is marked by a tension between its ontological and its historical 
claims. Sometimes it seems as if his ontology of generalised antagonism is somehow a-historical. But 
such a position would clearly be problematic, from both a theoretical and a political perspective: not 
only would it risk reliance on the kind of foundational ontology that Laclau putatively rejects, it 
would seem unable to account for the historical and social conditions that he does link to his 
ontology, and unlikely to inspire concrete political engagement with those conditions. Elsewhere, in 
contrast, Laclau emphasizes the particular historical conditions from which his logics emerge. But 
this brings its own problems: there is a circularity in referring an ontology to historical conditions 
whose own ontological status is not specified, and it raises the suspicion that such a logics would be 
merely the passive reflection of their conditions rather than offering critical purchase or wider 
application. Oscillating between these two positions, there seems in Laclau’s work to be a gulf 
between the ontological and the historical. 
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Laclau’s way of bridging this gulf is by calling upon the notion of real abstraction: the abstractions of 
his logics of hegemony (he claims) are real insofar as they are that towards which the concrete tends. 
He cites the notion of real abstraction in his attempt to develop abstract concepts which are 
connected to a particular historical context yet which nonetheless transcend that context and attain 
wider application. Yet in Laclau’s hands, real abstraction does not do the job required. His ‘real 
abstractions’ are ultimately intellectual abstractions from chosen historical ‘tendencies’. Such an 
approach merely reformulates the impasse already identified: either the ontological status of those 
historical tendencies themselves remains unexplained; or the ontological abstractions float free of 
the historical tendencies from which they are supposedly drawn. 
 
That the problem here is not the notion of real abstraction itself but its specific use by Laclau is 
made clear if we examine a materialist conception of real abstraction. We shall now turn to the work 
of the thinker who has done most to elaborate this notion: the critical theorist Alfred Sohn-Rethel. 
While this account leads us to curtail analysis of the critical reception of Sohn-Rethel’s work and cut 
off broader dialogue with alternative materialist accounts of the sources of mental abstractions, 
drawing upon Sohn-Rethel will nonetheless permit us to develop an account of real abstraction 
which neither reduces politics to ontology nor reduces ontological abstractions to some unexamined 
historical base.xxxv  
 
While Laclau focuses on the abstractions that might be derived from the tendencies of 
contemporary political discourses, Sohn-Rethel focuses on the more fundamental question of the 
conditions of abstraction as such. Accordingly, whereas Laclau’s work is undermined by a rupture 
between his ontology and the historical and political conditions of that ontology, the materialist 
understanding of real abstraction seeks to account for this rupture itself by locating the conditions of 
cognitive abstractions in historical and material practices, specifically in the division between mental 
and manual labour. Hence not only does the materialist conception avoid the division between 
ontology and history that marks Laclau’s work, it aims to explain the occurrence and persistence of 
this very division in modern thought. 
 
Sohn-Rethel’s goal is to provide a historical and materialist explanation of different forms of 
consciousness. He does so by analysing the emergence of philosophical thought in Greece, the birth 
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of modern science with Galileo, and Kant’s a priori, accounting for these intellectual developments in 
terms of the division of mental and manual labour that (according to Sohn-Rethel) characterizes all 
class societies.xxxvi His work hinges upon a materialist demonstration that cognitive categories reflect 
particular historical human practices – hence the subtitle of his magnum opus Intellectual and Manual 
Labour: A Critique of Philosophical Epistemology. Although he is a Marxist who frames his book as an 
enquiry into the relationship between base and superstructure, we believe that Sohn-Rethel’s 
methodology provides the resources necessary to move beyond a topographical schema.xxxvii Rather 
than viewing conceptual abstractions merely as a superstructural epiphenomenon of an underlying 
economic base, Sohn-Rethel begins from forms of consciousness and then infers what kind of 
society could have produced these forms. Hence his question is not: given this economic base, or 
this particular set of historical conditions, what kinds of thought should we expect? But, rather: 
given these concepts and truths, what must have been the conditions that gave rise to them? 
 
Laclau ultimately fails to connect the ontological and the historical because his notion of real 
abstraction maintains the divide between them: his ontological concepts are (at most) intellectually 
abstracted from historical tendencies (or, at worst, basically unrelated to them). For Sohn-Rethel, in 
contrast, the real abstractions in which thought abstractions are rooted are abstractions that take place 
not merely in our minds, but in our actions and practices, originating outside of thought. It is in this 
sense for Sohn-Rethel that ‘abstraction precedes thought’.xxxviii Instead of abstracting from historical 
conditions, Sohn-Rethel begins with our thought abstractions and traces them back to real 
abstractions. In this way, rather than relying on an ontology whose historical conditions cannot be 
formulated – as Laclau does – Sohn-Rethel can provide a socio-political analysis that can grasp its 
own conditions. We shall examine Sohn-Rethel’s arguments in more detail, before demonstrating 
why and how his work can help us develop a political logics that neither depends upon a 
topographical analysis nor subsumes politics into ontology. 
 
The Historical Origins of Abstraction  
Locating our thought abstractions in the real abstractions of material practices allows Sohn-Rethel 
both to acknowledge the non-empirical nature of those thought abstractions and to relate them to 
historical conditions. The key real abstraction that Sohn-Rethel identifies is that of commodity 
exchange. The real abstraction of commodity exchange effects what he calls a ‘social synthesis’. This 
refers to ‘the network of relations by which society forms a coherent whole’ – or, in other words, 
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what holds a society together.xxxix Different social syntheses give rise to different forms of 
consciousness or thought: ‘the socially necessary forms of thinking of an entire epoch are those in 
conformity with the socially synthetic functions of that epoch’.xl In pre-class societies, the social 
synthesis is effected by communal production. There is no division between intellectual and manual 
labour, but rather a ‘[s]ocial unity of head and hand’, in that there is collective control over the 
direction of labour: those who labour direct their own labour.xli In ‘societies of appropriation’, in 
contrast, there is a division of labour, and a surplus is produced that is appropriated by a ruling class: 
those who labour are directed by someone else, such that intellectual and manual labour are divided. 
Hence it cannot be the labour process that binds these class societies; rather, the social synthesis is 
effected by the private exchange of commodities between individual proprietors. To facilitate 
commodity exchange, money is invented as the universal abstraction, equivalent to every possible 
commodity. It is on the basis of the real abstractions of commodity exchange that the capacity for 
abstract thought can arise. 
 
When a commodity is exchanged, abstraction necessarily takes place. By positing an equivalence 
between two different objects we abstract from their actual, physical qualities: the exchange-value of 
the commodity is abstracted from its use-value. This is a real abstraction because it takes place in our 
actions and not in our minds: when we exchange, what we are thinking about is the use-value of the 
commodities exchanged (i.e. the qualitative properties of the object), but the real practice of 
exchange takes place in terms of exchange-value. In effect, exchange has the function of separating 
human consciousness from its actions: ‘[t]he action alone is abstract.  The abstractness of their 
action will, as a consequence, escape the minds of the people performing it.  In exchange, action is 
social, the minds are private’.xlii Because this real abstraction occurs first in social practices and not in 
the intellect, it can be said that abstraction precedes and is reflected in conceptual thought. The 
emergence of conceptual cognition reflects the abstract and universal character of commodity 
exchange as a non-empirical form, one which developed in the practices of the market rather than in 
thought. 
 
The fact that abstract cognition first appeared in classical Greece can thus be explained for Sohn-
Rethel by the development in classical Greece of coinage as the primary means of commodity 
exchange. The Greek conceptualization of Being as something that is unchanging, timeless, non-
empirical, and absolute is premised on the use of money as a timeless and immutable substance: 
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‘something real and yet detached from all and every sense-quality by which reality is real to us’.xliii 
The Greeks’ development of mathematics – the most abstract form of thinking we have – went 
hand in hand with their division of labour and the development of money. Although the ancient 
Egyptians may have used a rudimentary form of geometry to help make their pyramids, their 
division between mental and manual labour remained limited: Egyptian ‘geometry’ was tied to a 
specific manual skill (the use of ropes to calculate lengths and angles) and a specific practice 
(building pyramids). It was only in classical Greece that there occurred the development of what we 
know as geometry: a purely abstract form of thought detached from and independent of all manual 
practices and operations. It was only when manual and mental labour were separated and the social 
synthesis was effected by commodity exchange that the abstractions of mathematics became 
possible. The growth of relations of commodity exchange among private owners both facilitated and 
called for an increasingly sophisticated and abstract mathematics.xliv The manual operation of 
measure became subordinated to the act of pure thought directed to grasping the laws of abstract 
space over and above any particular practical task. Arising on the basis of a division between mental 
and manual labour, conceptual abstraction then consolidated and entrenched that division by 
reconstituting the relation between thought and manual labour in terms of abstract concepts. 
 
Using this framework, Sohn-Rethel traces the development of knowledge from antiquity, through 
the medieval period to the rise of merchant capital and the development of industrial capital. With 
the emergence of capitalism, the separation of manual from mental labour becomes stark. Whereas 
the artisan production of the middle ages depended on the practical ‘know-how’ of independent 
producers, capitalism requires the destruction of handicraft and the submission of workers to a self-
operating, automated production process dominated by machinery: production is controlled through 
both economic abstractions and the ideal abstractions of science.xlv  
 
Automation and the correlative historical necessity of modern science produce a technology that is 
no longer dependent upon the knowledge of the workers. The modern science which supports and 
reflects the material transformation to capitalist production is defined by the revolutions marked by 
the discovery of the laws of inertial motion which Sohn-Rethel, in perhaps his most tenuous claim, 
derives from the pattern of motion constituted in the real abstractions of capitalist commodity 
exchange.xlvi That is, the movement of the commodity in an absolutely abstract time-space occurs in 
economic life without being perceived by the mind and, in turn, inaugurates forms of mathematical 
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relations to nature whereby the movement of non-empirical concepts nevertheless ‘give such 
invaluable services in the investigation of nature’.xlvii   
 
The cognitive abstractions which Newtonian physics inaugurates and the division of industrial 
labour which it supports and grounds is philosophically reflected first in Descartes, but most 
forcefully in the Kantian a priori. For it is transcendental idealism most of all that singles out ‘a part 
of our being which is underivable from our physical and sensorial nature’ and according to which we 
relate to nature not as it is but only as it is mediated ‘for us’.xlviii Knowledge of nature is now 
absolutely divorced from any form of manual labour and is contained only in a ‘pure intellect’ which 
mirrors the abstraction of exchange-value from use. With Kant, and the philosophical epistemology 
grounded upon an ontological structure innate to man that he inaugurates, the reversal of manual 
and intellectual labour is complete. Now the sensual and sensible is nothing more than the 
possibility of error while only the abstractions of the intellect can provide any access to truth – 
though this is a truth that is always mediated by the finite capacity of the subject. The public 
freedom that Kant then demands for this subject is a freedom that implicitly veils and thus enshrines 
the division of intellectual and manual labour and the separation of labour from the means of 
production upon which it is constituted. The conversion of the priority of intellectual over manual 
labour, inaugurated by the Greeks, here becomes complete. 
 
From Political Topographies to Capitalist Logics  
By locating the source of cognitive abstractions firmly in the realm of practices, Sohn-Rethel permits 
us to re-inscribe the relation between history and ontology in a way that differs from Laclau’s 
articulation of real abstraction. Sohn-Rethel’s argument hinges upon the fundamental 
methodological priority he gives to historical over ontological conditions. It is in this sense that he 
claims that in the work of the later Marx (and, accordingly, in his own) there are no ontological 
postulates – no claim to some timeless conception of Being.xlix In Sohn-Rethel’s words, ‘the Marixst 
approach to historical reality can be understood as answering the question: what must the existential 
reality of society be like to necessitate such and such forms of consciousness?’l The historical 
materialist, he argues, works backwards: he infers the material social relations which would have 
formed the conditions for the emergence of particular abstract concepts, truths, social hierarchies, 
and so on. “It is on this purely critical line of procedure, on the standards of the very concepts he is 
out to criticize, that [the historical materialist] establishes the determination of a given mode of 
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consciousness by social existence, and thereby, as the intended result, succeeds in uncovering the 
true reality of that social existence”.li Just as Marx worked from the concepts of his contemporary 
political economy to the social relations they must presume, Sohn-Rethel claims that he works from 
contemporary epistemological propositions. In this sense, Sohn-Rethel insists that Marx’s own 
concepts must be affirmed as contingent, emerging out of a particular historical time and place. Such 
an approach allows us to trace the conditions of knowledge, without presuming to begin from a 
definite set of historical conditions from which we then infer forms of knowledge. 
Crucially, Sohn-Rethel does not reduce thought to the topographical, economically determinist 
visions of Engels or Plekhanov, whereby consciousness is reduced to the status of an objective 
reflection of an economic base. Such a schema already presumes a universal form of base and 
superstructure wherein a narrowly defined ‘economic’ sphere determines the contents of thought.lii 
In contrast, Sohn-Rethel’s theory of real abstraction seeks to investigate the forms of consciousness itself. 
This is not to say that Sohn-Rethel’s analysis is without problems. As we have seen, he locates the 
origins of real abstraction in the sphere of exchange. This is an unusual move, given the primacy 
accorded by Marxism to production over exchange. For Marx, the whole basis of exchange is the 
abstract labour that exists only under capitalism and which Sohn-Rethel purposely ignores.liii In 
contrast to Sohn-Rethel, what distinguishes capitalism for Marx is not commodity exchange, nor the 
division of mental and manual labour within production; it is rather that the goal of the capitalist 
production process is not the production of use-values by concrete labour but the production of 
value by abstract labour.liv Nonetheless, we maintain that Sohn-Rethel’s analysis is helpful, both for 
elucidating the concept of real abstraction as an alternative to the kind of intellectual abstraction 
upon which Laclau relies, and for his focus on the division between mental and manual labour 
 
Following this latter line of argument in particular would enable us to investigate the specific 
abstractions that dominate us today and to understand why there has been a shift away from a 
topographical analytic towards a different analytic of social logics. Whereas Laclau formulates this 
shift from topography to logics in terms of the historical manifestation of an ontology that was 
always-already immanent, we can make use of Sohn-Rethel’s framework to help us understand it in 
terms of historical changes to the division of mental and manual labour, and capitalism more 
broadly.  
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Though we do not propose to develop the argument fully here, we might speculate that a 
topographical analytic — in which the level of the economic is separated from that of consciousness 
— would have had political salience and purchase in an era of Taylorist production in which there 
was a separation within the production process between manual labour and the higher level 
cognitive activities whereby that manual labour was organised and managed. In contrast, with the 
emergence in recent decades of post-Taylorist and post-Fordist forms of production, the division of 
mental and material labour is undergoing reconfiguration. For instance: in certain sectors the 
function of intellectual labour is increasingly incorporated directly into the technological process of 
production itself; automation and computerisation have expanded to govern a broadening array of 
processes of labour and exchange; and expanding use of mechanisms of dispossession such as 
intellectual property regimes has entailed an extension of the commodification of the infrastructure 
of human existence.lv In short, the control of manual by mental labour is undergoing operative, 
spatial, and scalar transformations such that the topographical schema of social struggle that made 
sense under Taylorist conditions of production is now becoming increasingly obsolete. 
 
This admittedly brief analysis suggests that that the eventual decline of this orthodox (topographical) 
Marxist perspective need not be understood as confirming the derivative nature of the category of 
production to political theorising as Laclau argues. That is, rather than looking to the inevitable 
decline of economically determinist versions of Marxism as confirmation of some more 
‘foundational’ and seemingly a-historical political axiom or principle, acknowledging the material 
conditions of political theorising involves the refusal of excluding the category of production from 
attempts to theorise the conditions of social struggle in the present. This in turn implies that any 
emancipatory political theorization of organizational form and content must begin by reckoning 
with the extent to which contemporary capital subsumes social existence. 
 
We suggest that situating the conditions of cognitive abstractions in part in contemporary material 
practices and, in particular, in the abstractions by which capitalism governs social life (primarily the 
abstraction by the commodity) permits the materialist conception of real abstraction to account for 
specific historical transformations of epistemological categories. Moreover, contra Laclau, it implies 
that understanding political possibilities in the present begins with the analysis of the social logics of 
contemporary capitalism which condition those possibilities. While we do not intend to undertake it 
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here, such an analysis would have to confront (though this is by no means an exhaustive list): logics 
of debt, precarity, flexibility and the consequent transformations to the wage relation; logics of 
dispossession and financialisation, of the uneven nature of these processes as reflective of the nature 
of private property in the present; the apparent exhaustion of the geographical expansion of 
capitalist accumulation of biospheric wealth; and the crisis of capital’s ability to reproduce both 
labour and itself.  
 
As Alberto Toscano has argued, any attempt to transform our political abstractions which does not 
fully and formally grasp their ‘embeddedness in mechanisms of social reproduction’ overlooks the 
profound challenges that transforming them entails.lvi To fail to recognise the extent to which our 
own social struggles are conditioned, at least in part, by contemporary logics of capitalism is at risk 
of naturalising or even valorising those very logics. Finally, a material analysis of abstraction permits 
locating the criteria for our political concepts not in ontological terms as the failure or success in 
acknowledging the inherent contingency of any social order or discourse (as in Laclau’s work), but in 
the changing nature of contemporary social logics upon which they ought to give us cognitive 
purchase. Without such an analysis we risk misunderstanding the conditions in which we struggle in 
the present, especially if we seek to sustain that struggle in drawing upon some a priori conception of 
generalised antagonism. 
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